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Introduction
After years of collaboration with their partner institutions, Confucius Institutes have
faced harsh backlash that has led to the closure of many programs. While Confucius Institutes
are centers dedicated to disseminating Chinese language and culture, they’ve been put under
scrutiny for a multitude of reasons. Funded and structured by Hanban through the Chinese
Ministry of Education, tensions have flared over the use of Chinese government funding,
censorship in academic materials, and choice of U.S. colleges for the programs. With closures on
the rise and largely varied debate present in the scholarly community, the issue is becoming ever
more complicated.
In the midst of accusations made against Confucius Institutes leading to their closures,
it’s vital to account for how current global sentiments on China affect these decisions. The
modern day “China Threat” concept has brewed unfavorable discourse about China in the West,
making its way into China’s agendas outside politics and economics. This perception has
undeniably influenced discussions about Confucius Institutes, which accounts for some of the
backlash. Without the academic community’s ability to separate Confucius Institutes from the
CCP’s previous/current transgressions, the China Threat concept naturally becomes interwoven
in determining the fate of the institutes.
To properly assess the uproar of scrutiny and program terminations, it’s essential to
evaluate the claims made against CIs, if these criticisms are warranted, and how scholarship has
approached this topic. An investigation into CI funding, censorship, and political agendas will
assess these accusations. Although concrete political motivations are difficult to prove, CIs
unquestionably embody China’s soft power extensions abroad. The CCP has advertised its
Confucius Institutes as Chinese language and cultural hubs, dedicated to fulfilling global interest
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in Chinese studies. The institutes have attracted educational partners from all around the United
States. These programs appeal to schools that need to bolster their Chinese departments, but also
act as a tool abroad for shaping perceptions about China. While the thought of soft power in
education raises speculation of corruption, it has become a commonplace practice for many
foreign countries to promote their language, culture, and interests. Academically it poses
questions about the educational impact a subtle agenda may have on its students. Politically, the
mass closures following U.S. government backlash raise the question of whether this was a
successful soft power move for China.
Based on the paper’s in-depth analysis into Confucius Institutes and their criticisms,
accountability will be directed to the two culpable actors in this program backlash: Confucius
Institutes and American colleges. China has frequently been used as a scapegoat for the critiques
on Confucius Institute partnerships, but little liability has been placed on U.S. academic
institutions. As every CI program entails transparent and consensual agreements with the
participant colleges, these U.S. schools should bear considerable culpability in engaging and
promoting programs that others demonize. Predictions will also be made to what the future
entails for Confucius Institutes and general Chinese studies in America. What effects these CI
closures will generate remains up in the air; without adequate funding from Hanban or the U.S.
government, teaching and learning of this modern language could be at risk.

The “China Threat” Concept
A popular modern concept many critics of China employ is the term the “China Threat”:
the perception that China’s rapid economic, political, and social growth poses a threat to foreign
countries and their domestic security. While the term is most commonly applied in economic and
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political contexts of China’s advancements, those who oppose Confucius Institutes maintain that
the threat applies to China’s influence in academics abroad. Critics argue that Confucius
Institutes are a political mechanism of the CCP, and that the program’s strict adherence to the
CCP’s promoted traditional Chinese cultural values brainwashes students and poses a risk to U.S.
academic integrity. Some skeptics believe CIs could be a political front to harbor and recruit
pro-China spies. For these people the institutes’ presence on college campuses is a direct threat
to U.S. democracy and academic transparency.
This section will evaluate where anti-Chinese sentiments originated, and how they have
evolved in the West. This will show a trend in how anxieties about China have manifested itself
throughout time and led to the idea of the “China Threat”. Understanding the concept’s history
will tie directly into scholarship examining the China Threat in the CI context and examine the
primary “dangers” posed by such establishments: academic censorship, murky sources of
funding, and hidden political objectives. This literature has played an essential role in the
widespread disseminations of concerns about CIs, and potentially led to the dissolution of
programs. This paper offers an analysis that ties preconceived notions of China to how
Confucius Institutes have been seen and judged, emulating competitive Cold War sentiments
similar to that of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. Based on the United State’s
anti-Chinese attitudes and background in alienating powerful nations, scrutiny towards
Confucius Institutes must be met with skepticism.

Origins of Anti-Chinese Sentiments
The “China Threat” wasn’t the first anti-Chinese term levied against China’s world
expansion. Derogatory foreign sentiments against China can be traced back historically to
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terminology such as the “Yellow Peril”- a viewpoint created by Westerners in response to
uncertainties about the Orient.1 More recently this fear has been manifested as the “Red Peril”:
the fear of democratic nations against China’s communism. A theme arises of Western powers
“othering” a nation/idea outside their comfort, originating from a society that fears this
unlikeness. These concepts pervade the Western consciousness of China beyond political,
military, and economic reasoning; anti-Chinese sentiments creep their way into subconscious
attitudes towards China, affecting social and academic dynamics.
These racialized fears against China play into the modern “China Threat”. The most
important turning point in the making of this concept emerged after the 1989 Tiananmen Square
Massacre, where the PRC first emerged as a controversial force. This incident would incite
decades-lasting anti-Chinese sentiments, shared by nations of differing political associations and
economic standings. At the same point in time China’s economy expanded greatly in the late
1980’s/early 1990’s, rivaling top world economies and spurring global conversation. China’s
later accession into the World Trade Organization only further solidified China’s importance as
trade and outsourcing skyrocketed. It was Western nations alongside China’s rival peripheral
neighbors that composed the term “China Threat” to highlight their anxieties surrounding
China’s exponentially expanding global economy and authoritarian socialist political system.2
By this point in time Western nations had been attempting to politically reform the region
for decades, as they viewed China’s political philosophy as a threat to their process of
democratising the world. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 left China as the last powerful
communist country standing- simultaneously, the third wave of democratization in East Asia

1

Heather Schmidt. "China's Confucius Institutes and the “Necessary White Body”." Canadian Journal of Sociology
38, no. 4 (2013): 647-68.
2
Yee, Herbert., and Ian. Storey. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis,
2013.
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began to reform countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.3 China’s resistance to
liberal and democratic values sparked the Western usage of China Threat out of frustration with
China circumventing the U.S.’s agenda. Yee and Storey give insight into an unyielding American
ideology: “...democracy means peace and dictatorship means war. Thus, an undemocratic
socialist state like China remained a threat to regional and world peace.”4 Contrary to America’s
goals, it has been argued that shaming and alienating China in this way alternatively makes
China less willing to democratize.5 What started as a Western concept had spread by the early
2000’s into other territories as a product of countries uniting against a “corrupt” and “dangerous”
China. Although China has attempted to gain favor in the international community to repair its
negative reputation, the government’s blatant human rights abuses have delayed progress.
These sentiments and the “China Threat” come as no surprise to most scholars, especially
international relations experts such as John Mearsheimer. He contends that the global
competition for dominance is inescapable- that leading countries will seek hegemonic power
domestically and then internationally.6 The China Threat concept fits naturally in America’s
political agenda to democratize the world under its own authority- as China poses a threat to that
consolidation of power. While China seeks to politically unite its country, it will expand its
influence outwards just as the U.S. did after the Monroe Doctrine (which politically unified
Americans). The “China Threat” persists as an othering of China in comparison to Western
values, and furthermore as a tool to promote Westernization and democratization.

Scholarship on the “China Threat” and Confucius Institutes

3

Yee & Storey, China Threat, 3.
Yee & Storey, China Threat, 4.
5
Yee & Storey, China Threat, 33.
6
Mearsheimer, John J. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29. New York: W.W. Norton, 2014.
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As more United States colleges and universities move to shut down their Confucius
Institute programs, scholars have come to question the reasons behind doing so. The University
of Chicago was the first U.S. college to disband its Confucius Institute in September of 2014,
after faculty and students objected to its presence on campus. Pennsylvania State University
followed by closing their program that same month for reasons of differing educational and
research ambitions that Hanban wouldn’t approve of.7 While these two universities had shut
down their programs due to conflicting values or objectives, the greatest surge of closures would
follow in the years of 2017-present.8 This massive shift of CIs is influened by the publications
criticizing the institutes, alongside groupthink and pressure amongst school societies, peer
institutions, and the federal government.
One of the harshest critics of Confucius Institutes was the late Marshall Sahlins- one of
the University of Chicago professors who advocated for its CI program to be disbanded. In his
scathing pamphlet on Confucius Institutes, Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware, Sahlins
argues CIs threaten “academic freedom and integrity in the U.S. and elsewhere.”9 Although he
often inserts his own judgement on the matter, his pamphlet is overwhelmingly driven by
cherry-picked quotes from CI directors and critics. These quotes support the main points Sahlins
is trying to make: that Confucius Institutes are censored in alignment with the PRC’s
images/values, that the monetary funding of these institutions are likely shifty, and that CIs are a
detriment to the academic integrity of partner colleges. Through quotes from other critics he also
implies that Confucius Institutes are an extension of the “China Threat”- that American
education is at stake with this Chinese academic soft power initiative10. While he maintains that
7

Redden, Elizabeth. “Another Confucius Institute to Close.” Inside Higher Ed, October 1, 2014.
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/10/01/another-confucius-institute-close.
8
“How Many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States? .” National Association of Scholars, March 25, 2021.
https://www.nas.org/blogs/article/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states.
9
Sahlins, Marshall. Confucius Institutes- Academic Malware. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2015.
10
Sahlins, Academic Malware, 12.
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his views have nothing to do with China’s government policy or an anti-communism agenda, he
overlooks that CIs are fundamentally a Chinese government mission. Most, if not all, of China’s
projects abroad are directly bound to the CCP. To dismiss the idea of his pamphlet as a critique
of Hanban (and further, the CCP) was perhaps a technique to escape counter-criticism of
“othering” China.
A more neutral assessment on the issue of Confucius Institutes by Edward McCord
focuses less on “threats” and more on asking whether the threats are legitimate. In his article he
concludes that critiques of Confucius Institutes are not based in fact, observation, or reason;
instead, CI critiques are reflections of pre-existing concerns about China.11 McCord describes
this fault as an “echo-chamber” of worries against China; complaints and fears against Confucius
Institutes are a result of negative portrayals of Chinese politics, economics, and society through
mass media. This China Threat concept is oftentimes weaponized in the news and convinces
Confucius Institute critics to view potential problems as real- without always needing proper
evidence. Interestingly enough he emphasizes this through criticism of Sahlins: when Sahlins
was attempting to collect evidence of fraud through the Confucius Institute at the University of
Chicago, he found nothing suspect in the formal agreements.12 Moreover, McCord argues that
critiquing the statements put forth by Chinese officials on CIs are misinterpreted; scholars such
as Sahlins who scrutinize Chinese officials’ statements about CIs as “propoganda” don’t
understand the original intent of the word (as it was translated). Without understanding the
proper connotation of the Chinese word, his analysis is faulty. McCord discredits the idea that
the China Threat applies to Confucius Institutes is justified, and argues that many suspicions are
derived from preexisting notions.
11

McCord, Edward A. "Where's the Beef? Confucius Institutes and Chinese Studies in American Universities."
Critical Asian Studies 51, no. 3 (2019): 426-32.
12
McCord, “Where’s the Beef?”, 429.
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Schmidt takes an alternative approach to understanding the China Threat; she focuses on
the origins of anti-Chinese sentiments in understanding how they manifest with Confucius
Institutes. Terms such as “yellow peril”, “red peril”, and the modern-day “China Threat”
originate from Western societies who frequently oscillate between the “Self” and “Other”.13 The
“Self” aspect of his theory entails the desire for Western countries (especially America) to
preserve their democracy and extend it to foreign nations. The “Other” aspect of her theory
entails these Western nations alienating nations unlike their own, putting countries like China in
this perpetual lens of representing the opposing set of values. With the “China Threat”, these
Western societies see China as the Communist “Other” that is an imminent risk to the
Democratic “Self”. Extending this to Confucius Institutes, the China Threat reveals an
apprehension of western societies to learn and respect Chinese values/customs. Instead, critics of
CIs see these institutions as a threat to their democracy and individualistic academic customs14.
With a diversity of opinions on the threat of Confucius Institutes partnered with
American universities, how these threats manifest, and whether they are substantiated,
scholarship surrounding the “China Threat” theory and Confucius Institutes is divided. While
staunch critics such as Sahlins have generated conversation on CIs and likely have influenced
colleges in shutting down their programs, other sources combat his analysis and conclusion.
Intellectuals such as McCord and Schmidt focus less on directly attacking CIs, opting for an
approach to understand why and if CIs should bear such disapproval. Building off these authors’
analyses, the next section will pinpoint the major allegations and present evidence against many
of these unsubstantiated claims. Confucius Institute censorship, funding, and political agendas

13

Schmidt, “Necessary White Body”.
Sahlins, Academic Malware.

14

11

have been cited as promoting a deceptive partnership with U.S. schools. But without concrete
proof, the image of CIs coercing innocent American colleges falls apart.

The Components of the “China Threat” with Confucius Institutes
In understanding if the proposed threats of Confucius Institutes are legitimate, one must
first know what components of CIs are perceived as worrisome. Ardent critics like Sahlins focus
on a few primary problems: Confucius Institutes censor discussion about China’s questionable
moments in history and present-day interests, draw funding from the CCP’s propaganda
department (and alternate sources), and depend on large U.S. colleges to promote their political
agendas. For these reasons, many scholars have come to see these functioning cogs as a part of a
larger mechanism for China to push for dominance abroad. Since several of these issues
contradict western ideals of “independence” and “transparency”, they are deemed relevant to the
China Threat as U.S. institutions are “coerced” by these threats.

Censorship
Research into Confucius Institutes has revealed a trend of censorship in its U.S.
classrooms; taboo topics in China such as Tibet, the Dalai Lama, Tiananmen Square, Xinjiang’s
Muslim “re-education” camps, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have frequently been barred or ignored
in CI classes. For critics, this is seen as a disturbing dismissal of the truth-the U.S. has prided
itself on complete academic openness so there is no hindrance to access and knowledge on any
topic. With censorship on the line, the “academic integrity” of U.S. colleges is vulnerable to
restricted CI class material. This appears logically as a fair conclusion: many people would agree
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having unadulterated access to information is essential for having a thorough and valid
understanding of the truth.
Scholars on Chinese relations have long detected censorship in Confucius Institutes; in
2007 Shambaugh published a piece China’s propaganda systems, detailing how China has
managed its influence abroad. He mentions Confucius Institutes briefly, and how their primary
purpose was “intended to promote China’s cultural image and ‘soft power’.”15 In his chapter he
mentions censorship as a facet of China’s self-promotion and consequently criticized CIs for
misleading U.S. institutions. Critics of Confucius Institutes including Shambaugh see this
censorship as deceitful- even though CI directors have fully acknowledged that their programs
do censor specific material.
Evidence presented by Confucius Institute scholars, combined with numerous direct
statements from Chinese officials, have made it clear that Confucius Institutes censor some
subjects. Sahlin’s pamphlet cites several of these general statements and puts them in the context
of Confucius Institutes- even though the programs were never directly referenced. In 2010 Liu
Yunshan, China’s Minister of Propaganda, posted on the Yongning Government website that “we
[China] should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet,
Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong.”16 That same year he was quoted saying
“Make sure that all… cultural activities reflect and conform to the socialist core values.”17 Wang
Gengnian, Director of China Radio International, issued similar statements in 2011: “We should
quietly plant the seeds of our ideology in foreign countries, we must make good use of our
traditional culture to package our socialist ideology.”18 It’s logical that a Chinese-sponsored

15

Sahlins, Academic Malware.
Sahlins, Academic Malware, 6.
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Sahlins, Academic Malware, 6.
18
Sahlins, Academic Malware, 8.
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institute would be expected to uphold its own nation’s ideologies and principles- including
Confucius Institutes. Sahlin’s cherry-picked quotes may provide insight into China’s
methodology with foreign ventures, but must be criticized for the assumption that CIs are
interchangeable with the term “propaganda.”
Considering that most Confucius Institutes were established 2007 and beyond, with a
majority between the years of 2010-2019, much of this information on censorship was already
widely available. Speculation from critics was confirmed openly and transparently by CI
directors and Chinese officials. Knowing that partnering with Confucius Institute programs
would entail some form of censorship, a degree of fault falls on the U.S. university partners for
accepting funding and establishing a program it castsigates. The argument that CI censorship is
covert is unsubstantiated; the extent and subjects of CI censorship were confirmed before many
of these schools instituted their programs. Resting on this allegation that institutes infringed upon
the academic security of U.S. schools completely ignores decisions to willingly partner knowing
the regulations involved. They accepted the funding and layout of the programs and should take
responsibility if they collaborated with an organization they didn’t align with. If these schools
took issue with the censorship, either they hadn’t properly researched the program they were
accepting funding from or ignored it. While it’s understandable why many scholars would push
against censorship in U.S. colleges, the blame cannot be entirely shifted onto the program that
openly acknowledged such censorship. Without holding U.S. colleges/universities accountable,
this demonization of Confucius Institutes plays into the “China Threat” and the preconceived
notions of a deceitful, unfair China.
Aside from U.S. institutions dismissing their role in the matter, it has been argued that
Confucius Institutes cannot even justly speak on the topics without scrutiny. Much criticism that
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is directed at CIs comes not from what they are teaching, but rather from what they are not
teaching. To combat this issue the National Association of Scholars (NAS) suggests requiring
CIs to host classes or events on censored subjects.19 However, this recommendation itself
expresses and disseminates Chinese political ideologies and propaganda. If the Chinese
viewpoints on subjects such as the Dalai Lama, Tiananmen Square, or Taiwan were to circulate
on U.S. campuses, CIs would be accused of spreading pro-CCP sentiments antithetical to
Western values. Either way Confucius Institutes are set up for failure. Restricting conversation
on the topics is equated to academic dishonesty, and promoting conversation on the topics is
equated to political brainwashing. That is why CIs seek to limit their influence to teaching
Chinese language and culture- without focusing on political dogma.

Program Funding
Economic pressures including the Great Financial Crisis and wavering support for
modern language programs has threatened Chinese studies. As public colleges and universities in
the United States have faced decreased funding from the government, more institutions are
seeking alternate routes to secure financing for their programs. Moreover, U.S. language
departments have taken a hit as foreign language proficiency has not been bankrolled as a
priority. With a prevalent demand for an increase in Chinese language skills, Confucius Institutes
provide many of their partners with the funding and structure to deliver a strong Chinese
language and culture program. Jiang Feng, creator of the Confucius Institute, asserts that Hanban

19

Peterson, Rachelle. Rep. OUTSOURCED TO CHINA: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher
Education. National Association of Scholars, 2017.
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received numerous requests from foreign nations to assist their Chinese studies programs, and
that hundreds of inquiries were still on the waiting list.20
Initially, Hanban provides CI host institutions with $100,000-$150,000 of funding
annually for five years. With all U.S. Confucius Institutes combined, this equates to about $15
million of funding from the Chinese government yearly.21 This sum does not include all of the
other additional benefits to the host institution, including teacher recruitment, training, salaries,
travel costs, investment, and more. These benefits are not immediately quantified in dollar
amounts but are nonetheless tangible contributions to the host institution. Aside from visiting
faculty, it also funds the cultural programming, curricular materials for the classes, and the
reference libraries students have access to. Typically alongside this financing comes the
opportunity to partner with a “sister” university located in China. Through this connection
Hanban can train and send graduate students from the sister university to the host institution to
teach and/or manage the CIs.
The CIUS asserts that Confucius Institutes are non-profit organizations run by Hanban
and in affiliation with the CCP’s Ministry of Education. But some scholars, such as Sahlins,
contend that the MOE is a fraudulent front for the CCP’s External Propaganda Department.22 In
his pamphlet, Sahlins references Shambaugh, who argued that although the partnered institutions
are told that the MOE funds their programs, it is secretly laundered from the CCPPD.
Shambaugh contends that CIs’ purpose is to “...promote and popularize Chinese language and
culture by offering Chinese language and culture classes...all intended to promote China’s
cultural image and ‘soft power’.”23
20

Hubbert, Jennifer. China in the World: an Anthropology of Confucius Institutes, Soft Power, and Globalization.
Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2019.
21
McCord, “Where’s the Beef?”.
22
Sahlins, Academic Malware, 12.
23
Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System”, 50.
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The way in which these programs are established follow two main routes. The first is that
schools actively seek out Confucius Institutes and apply directly to Hanban to establish them.24
This way the U.S. college acts out of its own self interest in order to have a CI on campuswhether through desire for a better Chinese studies program, and/or the prestige of collaborating
with prominent Chinese universities. The second route takes the form of Hanban approaching a
specific educational or cultural institution with a proposal to start a program. Historically Hanban
has targeted elite universities in the U.S. and Europe, with the hope of maximizing its influence.
This way Hanban selectively appeals to the school itself, acting out of China’s own self interest
with convincing benefits for the U.S. institution.
In conjunction with the financial deficit of foreign institutes and allure of program
funding, scholars Zhou and Luk consider CI funding to be a bribe.25 They argue that Hanban
(and furthermore, the Chinese government) had the upperhand in these partnerships abroad; as
schools were lacking/cutting back funding for their Chinese language classes, Hanban was
convincingly offering program aid. They argue that hard-power coercion comes from this
financial commitment. The work references one CI director who was quoted saying that the
partnered CI programs should uphold China’s national interest because Hanban is funding their
institute- further pressuring other CIs to act accordingly.26 In the official guidelines and
constitutions/by-laws of CIs and Hanban, it is clear that the Confucius Institutes must abide by
China’s political and societal values. Bribes are by definition associated with dishonesty or
illegality- but through the legal agreements with CIs, host institutions are well aware of these
policies. There is something to be said about the clarity that Confucius Institutes must officially

24

Hubbert, China in the World, 14.
Zhou, Ying, and Luk, Sabrina. "Establishing Confucius Institutes: A Tool for Promoting China's Soft Power?" The
Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 638.
26
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follow China’s agenda, despite an uproar from scholars. More ambiguously, it can be debated
whether Hanban’s timing to allocate these funds was a part of a hard or soft power agenda; that
during times of financial uncertainty, Confucius Institutes may have targeted financially
vulnerable colleges for partnership with underlying motivations.
Schools may find Confucius Institute funding enticing- especially in the United States.
Although since 2005 Chinese has been determined as “a language critical to the U.S. now and in
the future” by the National Security Education Program (NSEP), the U.S. has made little
financial and developmental effort to promote the language.27 Some of the many problems in the
Chinese field include a lack of: certified teachers, widespread national effort, training programs
for instructors, learning materials, and immersive learning programs.28 Figure #1 below displays
the openings of American CIs over time; much of the graph’s activity reflects the financial
struggles and restrictions in the U.S. with few openings in 2008 (financial crisis) and 2016
(federal funding cutbacks). It is clear that America hasn’t prioritized language development in
times of economic uncertainty, and hasn’t capitalized on supplemental funding during these
years. While advancements such as AP Chinese classes and the National Council of Associations
of Chinese Language Schools (NCACLS) have helped institutionalize Chinese learning, it must
be acknowledged that many of these programs are conducted in association with China’s
organizations. If American schools wish to distance themselves from foreign financing, they
need to alleviate this funding issue.

27

Wang, Shuhan C. "Building Societal Capital: Chinese in the US." Language Policy 6, no. 1 (2007): 37.
Wang, "Building Societal Capital”.
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Figure #1

(Data collected from MLA’s 2016 Modern Language Census)

Political Agendas
Confucius Institutes have and will continue to serve under the guise of traditional
Chinese culture including classical art forms (calligraphy, dragon dances), holistic medicine
(cupping, herbal), and time-honored celebrations (Spring/Autumn Festivals). As stated by Liu
Yunshan, the CCP’s head of the propaganda department, the PRC will “Coordinate the efforts of
overseas and domestic propaganda, and further create a favorable international environment for
us... we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issuers such as Tibet,
Xinjiang, Taiwan, human rights and Falun Gong...We should do well in establishing and
operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.”29 However, scholars such as
McCord contend that the usage of the translated Chinese characters 宣传(xuānchuán) to the
English term “propaganda” is incorrect. The English word “propaganda” has a negative

29

Epstein, Ethan. “How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms.” POLITICO Magazine, January 17, 2018.
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327.
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connotation, while the Chinese characters “xuānchuán” carry a broader usage of “give publicity
to” or “disseminate” soft power.30
If Confucius Institutes were promoting political propaganda, there would likely be
concrete evidence of it. Although all CI instructors and classes are under U.S. oversight, no firm
proof of CCP propaganda has surfaced. There is no instated rule that materials supplied by China
must be used in CI classes- and oftentimes they are not used.31 The Hoover Institution, a
conservative public policy think tank operating out of Stanford University, issued a report on
Confucius Institutes discussing the proliferating accusations. After an analysis of Hanban
textbooks the report stated that they didn’t find “any evidence of interference by CIs in the
mainstream Chinese studies curriculum on U.S. campuses.”32 Still acknowledging the varying
opinions and allegations, the report argues that there are no overt political sentiments in the
materials or consistent controversies at the partnered institutions. The Hoover Institution takes a
more neutral stance on the issue and instead provides evidence that counters critics’ claims.
On the other hand a report by Rachelle Peterson from the National Association of
Scholars, a conservative nonprofit advocacy group, recommends for all partnered universities
and colleges to close their Confucius Institutes.33 In Peterson’s “weapons of soft power” section,
she details China’s political agendas through CIs; labeled as a “united front” the author slams the
connection of Confucius Institutes to the Chinese government, citing it as a method for China to
influence its public image abroad and “mobilize Chinese nationals living abroad.”34 She
concludes CIs are a part of China’s greater overseas propaganda efforts, and that students
engaged with CIs are subjected to a narrow and pro-CCP version of Chinese studies. Alongside
30
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the closing of all CIs, she recommends restricting visas to CI teachers, curbing federal funds to
schools with CIs, warning other schools about the dangers of CIs, and registering CIs as “foreign
agents.”35 Peterson emulates this “China Threat” perception in her report and recommendations,
criticizing schools for accepting funding from the Chinese government rather than criticizing the
quality of the CIs themselves. Nonetheless, her argument to disband CIs due to political
associations is a platform some CI critics rest upon.
Others believe that suspect activity is wrought between both players. Amidst accusations
of nefarious political activity and the questioning of the sources of Confucius Institute funding,
critics have speculated that partnered American institutions may be complicit in their role in
China’s political agenda. Some CI critics believe there should be some distinction of suspect
clauses in the confidential Memoranda of Understandings (MOU) drafted between Hanban and
U.S. institutions that would reveal these allegations. For example one of the originators of the
anti-Confucius Institute Movement, Marshall Sahlins, contended that there would be
questionable activity in the MOUs with the University of Chicago. Although his suspicion
behind the MOUs influenced his judgement on Confucius Institutes, once Sahlins inspected the
formalized agreements he found nothing suspect.36
After evaluating the mutual benefits, it is evident that the bond between the Confucius
Institute and the university could bring political power to both countries. As countries including
America have sought ways to curb the decline in the study and practice of foreign languages,
Confucius Institutes pose educational and political opportunities to expand the global prowess of
its students. By accepting funding and establishing a CI program, the participating institution can
revive participation in lucrative languages such as Chinese that currently serve an important role.
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For regions including (but not limited to) the U.S. and the U.K., Confucius Institutes provide a
gateway to maintain and expand their relationship with China. While many of these Western
countries rely on business and political dealings with China, broadening the scope of their
relationship to cultural levels would solidify less transactional agendas. This also presents an
opportunity for China to influence the world through soft power: by engaging schools in learning
Chinese learning, more interest in China can be generated abroad.

China’s Soft Power
In the time of China’s current competitive economic, military, and political clout, its
influence is no longer constrained to hard power ventures. As negative and aggressive images
associated with China proliferate amongst Western political and economic discourse, featuring
pictures of Mao Zendong or mythical fire-breathing dragons, China has escalated its efforts to
improve its image abroad. With the goal in mind of expanding global access to Chinese cultural
and educational materials, it has shifted its focus to show its “true” essence to the world
community.37 While Confucius Institutes have been seen by some as one of China’s most
forward-looking soft power initiatives, others have come to scrutinize the impact of foreign
government intervention in academic programs.
Evaluating China’s recent cultural ventures abroad, this section will examine Confucius
Institutes as another mode of soft power. To better understand CIs under these criteria, their
success will be evaluated after clarifying what soft power is and what the programs goals are.
While scholars have often assessed the institutes under the guise of Nye’s Western conception of
soft power, the Chinese culture-centered version will be prioritized. To respond to the
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judgements on foreign soft power present at U.S. institutions, a subsection will be dedicated to
understanding the educational impact of Confucius Institutes on American campuses. This will
provide a clearer picture on how CIs serve as soft power, if they have been successful in the
endeavors, and whether they have negatively or positively impacted U.S. education.

China’s Soft Power Initiatives
The Chinese government has encouraged globalization action since the mid/late 1970’s
through the concept of “inviting the world in” (引进来).38 Since at this time China was seeking
prospects to expand economically, a promotion of foreign investment would secure domestic
wealth for Chinese manufacturers. What followed was China’s development in production and
manufacturing, whose efficiency skyrocketed the nation as the “world’s factory”. Now consumer
goods sought by Westerners were overwhelmingly being produced by and in China. This
promotion of the country as the globe’s manufacturer swept Western nations with goods labeled
“made in China”- a small detail that would set up China for a broader expansion of influence.
Following its economic amplification in global markets, China began a new phase of
globalization practices centered around increasing the government’s power and influence through
foreign projects. In the 1990’s and 2000’s, China began investing in global enterprises, purchased
technology/development projects, founded multinational corporations, and raised its prominence
in international organizations. Whether it was China’s 2008 hosting of the Summer Olympics or
joining of the World Trade Organization, China had its foot in the door. Now China’s
globalization has expanded beyond hard power limitations: it is a member of the international
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community. However, maintaining such a presence requires calculated effort within areas of
importance.
Since the 2000’s, China has prioritized specific soft power ventures; China created an
international TV channel (CCTV), sent its art across the world for display (Terracotta Soldiers),
translated their famous works into foreign languages, and began academic pursuits abroad
(Confucius Institutes).39 At this point China aimed to focus not only on the administrative power
of advancing its military, economics, and politics, but also on the dissemination of its culture and
language. Confucius Institutes are designed to fit into that agenda; at its partnered U.S.
universities, Confucius Institutes employ professors from China, fund language and cultural
classes, and host Chinese holiday/entertainment events. By financially supporting the interest in
Chinese studies abroad, China seeks to increase foreign engagement with its language and
culture.

Confucius Institutes as Soft Power
Academic soft power initiatives have been commonplace in the United States for
decades- language/culture program funding from foreign governments is nothing new. Examples
include Germany’s Goethe-Institut in Washington D.C. and France’s French Institute Alliance
Française in New York City- both of which are promoted as language and culture centers. There
are many merits to expanding soft power in this way. By encouraging a country's presence in
foreign institutions, it is likely more educated individuals will pursue a career connected with the
country where otherwise they wouldn’t have the resources to do so. However, it is important to
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break down and analyze the underlying reasons why, when, and where a country chooses to
promote their programs.
There are a multitude of factors that guided where Confucius Institutes were established:
the degree of the college’s population, prestige, private/public position, presence of international
students, and existence (or lack thereof) of a Chinese studies program.40 In choosing where to
fund Confucius Institutes, China had a greater preference for larger universities with a student
population exceeding 4,500- which usually entailed public or well-known colleges. Prestige is a
large facet in the decision-making; not only would China seek high-ranking universities such as
Stanford, Columbia, and Tufts, but also would seek universities close to large metropolitan
centers such as Temple, Rutgers, and George Mason. The presence of Chinese students or a
Chinese program at the university also plays an important role. Confucius Institutes are more
likely to be instituted at schools that already have a large international student population and
decent Chinese studies department. Having an existing presence of Chinese language and culture
on campus aids the process of establishing a CI. All elements of the decision-making process
considered, these facets work in conjunction to promote China’s image effectively and
efficiently. By choosing larger and more prestigious schools, China can maximize the impact of
its Confucius Institutes through sheer widespread dissemination among the most successful
students and academic communities. By choosing schools more integrated with foreign students
and studies, China can sidestep potential criticism that it might face at less tolerant colleges.
However, it should also be noted that Confucius Institutes have partnered with schools
lacking a concrete Chinese studies program or elite reputation. Hanban has funded CIs at
religiously affiliated colleges (Pacific Lutheran University in Washington, Presbyterian College
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in South Carolina), HBCUs (Xavier Univeristy of Louisiana), and career oriented institutions
(State College of Optometry in New York, San Diego Global Knowledge University). In these
instances Confucius Institutes serve to create language programs where they traditionally might
not have existed. For many students this was an opportunity to finally take Chinese language and
cultural classes, or participate in study abroad programs. While China has strategically partnered
with high-ranking popular universities, it has diversified its impact by engaging with
communities where a Chinese presence may be lacking.
It’s clear that by nature Confucius Institutes are indirectly spheres of soft power- by
promoting Chinese language and culture, the institutes are advancing China’s image and
relevance in foreign communities. The factors considered where to establish these programs also
reflect China’s desire to have impactful relationships. By choosing predominantly prestigious
U.S. universities in/near populous cities, the mission of CIs reaches wider and more prominent
communities. Simultaneously engaging with communities devoid of a Chinese presence, CIs
diversify its reach and scope of soft power.
While many scholars contend that Confucius Institutes embody a form of soft power that
is used to fulfill a broader agenda, there are some that argue that CIs are not soft power at all.
Zhou and Luk press the idea that CIs are one facet of China’s hard power, because they fulfill
underlying economic and political goals in the long-term.41 By analyzing the “payments'' and
“bribes'' incurred by Confucius Institutes alongside the negative associations, they assert that this
initiative should no longer be seen as “soft”. The authors believe China could use Confucius
Institutes to promote soft power, but find there are several road-blocks that prevent such
approach; Hanban is focused on the spread of CIs abroad rather than the strengtheneing of the
established programs, leading to a decline in individual quality. They also argue the image and
41
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values of China represented through these programs seems unclear. Without consistent defined
ideals and practices, critics have grown skeptical of what messages the program is trying to
deliver.
Others upend that soft power is thought of and applied differently in countries. Fliegel
and Kříž assert that the modern concept of soft power originated from the American scholar
Joseph S. Nye, who popularized the term in the 1980’s.42 After the Cold War when the U.S. felt
its relative power receding, Nye formulated the concept in order to keep America in a dominant
political and social position. Created by a U.S. liberal and primarily applied to serving that
country’s aims, “soft power” has been seen as only compatible with similar liberal mindsets.
Contrary to this, the authors maintain that China has been practicing soft power as early as the
fifth century; philosopher Sun Tzu emphasized the benefits of a state winning without applying
force.43 This is similar to Nye’s vision of soft power of co-opting rather than coercing a country.
A major difference is that China’s soft power follows a top-down approach: high-ranking
officials create the policies and are followed down through the ranks of lower officials. As
American soft power functions from a bottom-up approach, critics come to see Chinese soft
power ventures as a problematic power play. Since the governance of the U.S. and China differ
between liberal-democratic and socialist institutions, there is a disparity between soft power
actors operating with and without government constraints. Americans can actively voice their
opposition when their country is at fault, giving the illusion that their society is free and equal.
Chinese citizens cannot engage in such discourse, so soft power is controlled majorly by the
government. China has embodied their own distinct soft power approach through Confucius
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Institutes; as CIs are directly funded and controlled by the CCP, they are a governmental venture
rather than a community-led venture. The institutes follow China’s conception of soft power, and
should be analyzed under its own terms rather than be defined by a Western notion.
Walker and Ludwig present a new conception of China’s ventures domestically and
abroad- what they deem are a part of “sharp power”. Although the source does not touch upon
Confucius Institutes directly, it presents a different synthesis to what many scholars would define
as “soft power”. As soft power has traditionally been identified as the “ability to affect others by
attraction and persuasion”, the authors proclaim China’s endeavors cannot be seen as such.
Instead, China’s efforts should be conceptualized as sharp power: “...in which their actions seem
to impair free expression to compromise and neutralize independent institutions, and to distort
the political environment.”44 In this way it could be argued that Confucius Institutes do not reap
soft power through appeal and attraction, but rather through changing or distorting institutions’
outlook on China with overt political motives.
As shown through conflicting opinions on what defines soft power and whether
Confucius Institutes should be regarded as such, there is no conclusive judgement on the
situation. Different countries have their own approaches and opinions on soft power, and CIs
should be evaluated under both the Chinese and American conceptions. Doing so provides
insight to the scholarship criticism towards CIs when interpreting its intentions under a Western
lens. Understanding the Chinese version of soft power gives more insight into what CIs hope to
accomplish and clears up potential misconceptions.

The Impact of Soft Power in Higher Education
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Historically it has been difficult for China to spread its soft power in foreign countries.
Both China’s highly contested politics and early stages of soft power development contribute to
its inefficiency.45 However, it has recently made great strides in promoting Chinese language and
culture abroad: China’s government has worked alongside the College Board to create AP
Chinese language courses and tests, has funded international teacher training programs, summer
camps for U.S. students, and has provided scholarships for Chinese-interested foreigners.
Confucius Institutes are another facet of China’s growing influence in education, with the
primary goal of engaging more outsiders with Chinese studies. However China’s highly
controversial hard power aims (politically, militarily) have led scholars, professors, and students
to question whether China is fit to lead truly fair and informative educational programs abroad.
Scholars and U.S. government officials have generated major pushback on Confucius
Institutes, with prominent argumentation asserting that the “threat the institutes pose to the
ability of the next generation of American leaders to learn, think, and speak about realities in
China and the true nature of the Communist Party regime.”46 They believe that CI materials and
agendas pose a serious risk to U.S. academics, and will essentially brainwash students into a
pro-CCP point of view. Although it has been claimed that the institutes monitor the lives of
Chinese students on campuses, heavily influence schools’ curriculums, and restrict anti-China
criticism in communities, these allegations are unsubstantiated with scant or nonexistent
evidence. These critics largely overstate the power of Confucius Institutes on college campuses,
and devise this narrative that the students’ and schools’ education can be toppled by one
supplementary academic establishment.
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With carefully structured and devised Chinese educational programs comes the
opportunity for students and scholars to examine the purpose of the format. As Confucius
Institutes primarily promote traditional Chinese philosophy and culture, many have come to
question why these programs avoid topics of modern Chinese society. Many Confucius Institutes
are partnered with top U.S. universities, thus students and staff have the resources to form their
own judgements on the instruction in CI classrooms. It is argued that CIs provide students with
the platform to analyze and explore global agendas behind the institutes themselves; these
orderly, carefully forged programs are a gateway to understanding modern Chinese political
strategies, cultural values, and educational practices.47 In this way students not only have access
to learn traditional Chinese language and culture, but also engage with CIs in a constructive
manner. Students and scholars are not benign actors in the entanglements of Confucius Institutesthey are active intellectual minds who formulate their own opinions based on a multitude of
encounters with Chinese academics, media, and news. This is an unforeseen, and oftentimes
overlooked, educational benefit of CI partnerships.

Success of Confucius Institutes as a Soft Power Force
To understand if Confucius Institutes are serving China as a successful soft power
operation abroad, two things must be understood: what the original mission of CIs is, and what
constitutes a successful form of soft power. The purpose and intent behind Confucius Institutes
have been told differently among CI directors and scholars, as aforementioned in the scholarship
review. A recent 2020 letter by Gao Qing, director of the Confucius Institutes, generally
describes the mission as “a means to help students and educators find educational, academic,
cultural and arts courses, initiatives and programs concerning Chinese language, culture and
47
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arts.”48 While this description leaves out the Chinese self-serving aspects of initiating Confucius
Institutes, this broad generalization encapsulates the basic elements and overall impact of
Hanban’s funding to the partnered institutions. Previously noted, soft power is defined by Nye as
“...the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises
from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”49 Some scholars
argue that China has a different conception of “soft power”, and others see CIs as sharp/hard
power ventures.
Nye’s definition of soft power took hold amongst Chinese scholars, stimulating debate
with varied perspectives. Chinese intellectuals believed that soft power was essential to China’s
comprehensive national power, 综合国力 (zònghé guólì), and likened Nye’s theory to early
concepts in Confucianism.50 Wang Huning, the deputy director of the Policy Research Office of
the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), was the first in China to publish on soft power. His opinion
echoed the majority view on China’s soft power: that, for China, “the core of soft power is
culture.”51 Rather than focusing on promoting national politics and policies, China has focused
on making Chinese culture accessible and attractive to foreign audiences. Chinese university
administrators have contended that Confucius Institutes should not be seen as a promotion of soft
power, and should be seen in an academic light rather than a political one. However, I believe
that this defensiveness is in response to Nye’s soft power concept. CIs function under the lens of
Chinese soft power, as these institutes are fundamentally language and cultural centers. To better
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conceptualize the success of Confucius Institutes as soft power, I will be evaluating them under
the lens of China’s soft power and program goals.
Based on research into China’s public image where Confucius Institutes are established,
it seems that their soft power ventures have proved successful. Not only through the
dissemination of Chinese language and culture in college societies, but also by relieving some of
China’s negative associations. The CCP has sought to promote positive sentiments of China
through these institutions.52 In the areas in which Confucius Institutes are set, there has been a
noticeable positive shift in the tone of media reports on China’s affairs in contrast to before the
establishment. China has favorably managed to shape its public image abroad, though not always
locally, but by subtly changing the overall negative associations with China that circulate in
discourse. By doing so Confucius Institutes have proved to be a beneficial and powerful soft
power initiative.
In their empirical analysis on CIs redefining China’s image abroad, Brazys and Dukalskis
utilized the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) to cross-examine local
medias’ tonal shift in areas with active institutes. They gathered 315,923 foreign media
observations on Confucius Institutes whose tones ranged from -20.97 (more negative) to +22.68
(more positive). After consolidating 6,012 global tone locations, they found 38,922 occurrences
of Average Tone (+2.91) that shows neutral/slight positivity towards China. This 2019 study,
while imperfect as measuring tone is subjective, suggests that there is a relatively even tone
distribution across areas with Confucius Institutes.
Despite the positive change in reports surrounding China, Confucius Institutes’
activeness did not factor into this. To try and account for the variability in the tonal shift, Brazys
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and Dukalskis devised a chart to explain the discrepancies. Schools that have active Confucius
Institutes presence generate a favorable shift in local tone media (+0.263) compared to that of
inactive Confucius Institutes (+0.073). The divergence is seen as significant, and shows how the
CI impact on local media decreases farther away from the CI location. Due to this analysis,
actively engaged Confucius Institutes can be confirmed by this model as a successful soft power
maneuver. CIs operating in communities were able to positively shape local perceptions on
China, despite the mass closures since 2014.
There is evidence that Confucius Institutes were able to manage China’s image abroad,
which was the primary goal of China’s soft power venture via the Belt and Road Initiative. But it
can also be argued they were unsuccessful due to community backlash and the massive surge of
program closures. Confucius Institutes are slowly becoming obsolete in the U.S. amidst a slew of
government mandates and public pressure. Figure #2 below depicts the rapid nature of these
closures, ending with the twelve closures announced for this year (thus far). CIs have failed in
terms of longevity, but have nonetheless planted a seed of pro-China sentiments on college
campuses across the country. A combination of the “China Threat” and the CCP’s unwillingness
to compromise eventually led to the demise of these institutions, but were a stepping stone in the
formulation of more long-lasting Chinese influence abroad.
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Figure #2

(Data collected from NAS’ 2021 Closure Chart 53)

To see if Confucius Institutes closed due to their own inadequacies as soft power
programs, I constructed Figure #3 below displaying the proportions of stated reasons for
dissolving their CIs. A vast majority of these posted school announcements fell into six different
types of reasoning: lack of interest, jeopardy/cuts in federal funding, national/school security
threat, incompatible goals/interests, change in school/program (replaced by new Chinese
program), or no stated reason. As depicted below, the reasoning was spread out with the highest
proportion being jeopardy/cuts in federal funding or no stated reason. This follows logically, as
the U.S. government’s major pushback threatened the financial security of schools reliant on
their aid. The presence of the national/security threat conformed to the concerns of the U.S.
government rather than the school’s individual concerns of security. Other reasons such as lack
of interest, incompatible goals/interests, and change in school/program reflect the weaknesses of
Confucius Institutes themselves. The institutes weren’t engaging thoroughly with the host
community, wouldn’t expand its interests into research-based studies, and were sometimes
replaced by other Chinese programs/departments. If they sought to alleviate these issues,
53
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Confucius Institutes would have been much stronger soft power programs. However there is a
large presence of stated reasons outside the CIs’ control, aggravated by the U.S. government’s
negative response to China in higher education.
Figure #3

(Data collected from NAS’ 2021 Closure Chart 54)

Accountability
The utilization of soft power in foreign countries, especially in academics, is no new
reality. Once a nation begins to gain prominence, it looks outward to expand its culture and
influence. The United States is no exception to this; America has a multitude of connections
around the world, using soft power to maintain its powerful standing in the international
community. Whether that be through cultural centers abroad, funded scholarship programs such
as Fulbright, or mission trips to third world countries, the U.S. has consistently pushed its
democratic, Christian, and liberal ideals abroad. Since China’s socialist and communist values
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are not in alignment with the Western-minded ideals and “soft power” theory, its comparable
academic ventures have been labeled as propaganda “brain-washing”.
With U.S. educational institutions accepting partnership and funding from the CCP
through Confucius Institutes, it raises the question who should bear responsibility for the
criticism directed at the programs. China, who constructed, funds, and runs these programs, or
the U.S. institutions, who accept the funding, guidelines, and gain their own distinct soft power
benefits? Confucius Institutes unjustly bear the brunt of criticism in the scholarly community, so
this section will offer a unique analysis of the wrongdoings and hypocrisy of U.S. institutions.
CIs and U.S. schools both played a role in this relationship, so it’s essential to assign
accountability to both. Confucius Institutes (and furthermore the CCP) have been relatively
inflexible in addressing criticism, despite its desire to collaborate with colleges abroad. This
unwillingness has aggravated the ill-feelings towards the institutions, and have generally made
them appear weaker and less trustworthy. U.S. institutions should take accountability for their
role in choosing to partner with CIs; American schools should not feel taken advantage of by
Confucius Institutes, after consenually accepting funding, guidelines, and practices. Building off
sentiments and information from the previous sections, this analysis will shed light on how CIs
have been used as scapegoats for blame on American schools.

China/Hanban/CCP
Since Confucius Institutes were created and funded by Hanban, and by extension the
CCP’s Ministry of Education, most criticism of the programs falls on China. This comes as no
surprise as scholarly debate on the efficacy of the programs surrounds its sources of funding,
censored materials, and underlying political agendas. In my opinion it is difficult to scrutinize
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Confucius Institutes based on their agreed-upon content and procedures: the American schools
actively chose to partner with CIs, knowing compliance for funding is required. One cannot
demonize Confucius Institutes for enforcing the proceedings they set forth in formal agreements,
as U.S. colleges are aware of what arrangements they agreed to. Based on this, I cannot argue
that CIs should take sole accountability for their censorship, alleged political aims, and
government funding- these components were permitted and known by U.S. colleges before
partnership. Thus, this cannot be seen as coercion as some scholars have contended. Instead I
offer the perspective that Confucius Institutes lack cooperation with the communities they seek
to collaborate with- furthermore, that denying this responsibility has made Confucius Institutes a
much weaker academic program.
Confucius Institutes are not inherently political in their materials and teachings, but it
would be naive to believe Hanban didn’t anticipate political/cultural pushback. The CCP is
resolute in its adherence to its values and practices, oftentimes shying away from discussing its
controversial actions. However there exists an immense benefit to blurring China’s strict
formalism of maintaining its international reputation; by opening itself up to criticism and
encouraging students to be current on Chinese affairs, Confucius Institutes can protect academic
freedoms while continuing to operate the same. The textbooks have already been proven devoid
of political propaganda- and Confucius Institutes aren’t required to use them anyways. Instead
CIs should encourage students to research current Chinese events on their own accord, and allow
students to discuss these topics with professors. Barring conversations on certain topics only
incites more interest, so it would be wiser to diffuse tension in this way.
The Confucius Institute U.S. Center (CIUS) posted a final report in November of 2020
detailing the failures of the institutes, and suggesting ways to alleviate the negative tension.55 Out
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of the six recommendations, only a few struck me as viable for curtailing criticism: to train CI
teachers on the “nature of governance in U.S. universities”, clarify the CI mission within the U.S.
institution’s context, and promote the academic components of the programs. These are steps that
could aid China in assimilating to working in foreign communities, which could make programs
more palatable. These recommendations seem to align with my suggestions, although CI’s
interpretation and actions could easily deviate from these thought processes. Training teachers on
school environments/governance, as well as interpreting the institutes’ missions within the U.S.
context, could easily aid the programs in readjusting. By promoting professor understandings of
American schools and their practices, CIs could relieve some of the tension on campuses. CIs
have traditionally barred anti-China topics from discussion, but redefining the mission and
partnership to be cooperative could open that door.

U.S. Institutions
The major appeal of Confucius Institutes is the mutually beneficial relationship that
comes from their partnership; U.S. schools have guaranteed funding for their Chinese
department, ties to prestigious Chinese universities, presence in China’s academic community, as
well as opportunities for their students to gain international experience. However, during my
research I’ve found that very few critics of Confucius Institutes acknowledge this gain for
America; instead, U.S. schools and students are often portrayed as benign actors who fell victim
to China’s deceptive soft power antics. This perception is misconstrued, harmful, and unfair as
both Confucius Institutes and U.S. institutions sought to benefit from this relationship. As
analyzed previously, there is no conclusive evidence of wrongdoings by these Chinese programs.
Thus, the subsequent denunciation of CIs by scholars and schools should be shifted to hold
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American colleges accountability for their role in the issue.
U.S. institutions undeniably receive many benefits from Confucius Institutes; on a
financial front these schools secured funding from the institute, recruited and trained teachers,
materials including textbooks, and increased access to academic programs in China. Less
directly, these colleges benefited from Chinese university partnerships, intellectual
examination/interpretation of the programs, and development of their Chinese department. By
fulfilling the demand for foreign language proficiency, these schools can stay competitive
domestically. By enrolling more students in Chinese language and culture classes, U.S. schools
have the opportunity to mold their students into global citizens. Confucius Institutes pose many
financial, status, and structural benefits to Chinese departments- which is why many U.S.
universities approached the Ministry of Education to request a program. The initial appeal was so
great that many American colleges sought out CIs, instead of China targeting such foreign
institutions.
These U.S. schools act upon their own free will, yet bear nearly no responsibility for the
criticism thrown at CIs. They accepted funding, agreed to expectations, and sought benefits from
this partnership. However, when Confucius Institutes began to face criticism and terminations,
why were fingers not being pointed at American colleges for hosting them? These were not
deceptive programs lurking in the backdrop, preying on schools needing assistance; it becomes
apparent that anxieties surrounding China proliferated, leading the blame to naturally shift onto
CIs. U.S. educational institutions, seen as purveyors of academic truth and freedom, evade being
reprimanded when forcibly “othered” countries like China are involved in the situation. Scholars
have continuously looked outward for the perpetrator of their problems, and instead refuse to
look inward to their own country’s involvement.
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Future of CIs and China’s Soft Power
State actors, scholars, and U.S. institutions have influenced the legacy of Confucius
Institutes in America. In the last six years there has been a sweeping trend of closing CIs, which
has forced China to reconsider its approach in Chinese language/cultures abroad. There have
been a few small acts of reform to alleviate some criticism towards the programs, but no concrete
plan has been announced by Hanban. As more schools are at risk of closing, the spotlight is on
China’s program changes and U.S. institutions’ decision to dissolve or restructure their
relationship.
What the termination of Confucius Institutes on U.S. college campuses means for
Chinese studies programs is still an open question. For schools reliant on CI funding to develop
their Chinese department, the closures pose a threat to the continuation of these studies;
underprivileged schools grapple with the potential of losing federal funding if they keep their
Confucius Institutes. These educational institutions reliant on aid from external parties are
vulnerable to this government pressure. To conclude my paper on Confucius Institutes on
American campuses, I will predict what the future holds for Confucius Institutes and U.S.
schools. This section will evaluate the trend in Confucius Institute closures/reorganization, how
this shift will impact Chinese studies in the U.S., and what this means for the future of Chinese
soft power in foreign academia.

CI Program Closures & Renaming
Since the introduction of the U.S. Confucius Institutes/Classrooms in 2004, 119 programs
were set up in colleges, universities, and K-12 schools in the subsequent years. The University of
Chicago was the first institution to close its Confucius Institute in September of 2014, and since
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then, 74 other schools followed suit and shut down their CIs.56 Since the closures disbanded over
half of the Confucius Institutes in the United States, the question remains what is the future of
CIs and China’s participation in U.S. academics. What will happen to the remaining 50 CI
programs is still very much up in the air.
To deal with these pressing concerns, Hanban has undertaken measures to ensure the
longevity of CI programs. Hanban has rebranded itself as the “Ministry of Education Center for
Language Exchange and Cooperation”- or the Ministry of Education in short. Hanban is also
seeking to create a new non-governmental organization to oversee the programs, named the
“Chinese International Education Foundation.”57 Although realistically, the idea of China
genuinely creating a NGO to oversee the institutes is unlikely; the CCP has a hand to play in
virtually all organizations, companies, and programs originating from China.
The title changes could be interpreted as China’s method to distance itself from
potentially negative associations with overtly Chinese-sounding names. “Hanban” is a Chinese
term and “Confucius Institute” carries associations with traditional Chinese ideology; meanwhile
“Ministry of Education” (substituted for Hanban) and the “Chinese International Education
Foundation” (substituted to oversee Confucius Institutes) sound more Western and carry neutral
connotations. This could be a strategy to appeal to a broader Western audience or simply clarify
the mission of the organization. There is no concrete evidence for the reason why, so readers
must formulate their own judgements on the situation.
Despite the formal closures, the hypothesis exists that some colleges haven’t overtly cut
ties with their Confucius Institutes despite disbanding their programs. The National Association
of Scholars believes that some CIs still secretly operate under a new name, continuing to employ
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the same staff and promote the same curriculum.58 The NAS article had no proof to back up the
accusations, but it could be alluding to the rebranding of Hanban’s name or the creation of the
NGO monitoring the CIs. In this sense Confucius Institutes are operating under a different name,
but only at schools that haven’t yet dissolved their programs. Accusations like this must be met
with skepticism, as it misinterprets factual information and feeds into the “coercive” and
“dangerous” China conception.
The Confucius Institutes that are still active have also sought methods to curb the
negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. With decreased in-person access to cultural events
and classes, many students have lacked the resources to succeed in Chinese studies. The
pandemic has also brought new financial uncertainties to American colleges, which could
aggravate the issue further. To curb the loss of interest or participation in Chinese studies this
year, the CIUS has placed many teaching materials/classes online. This includes interactive
cooking lessons, virtual storytelling, museum tours, and language instruction.59 Other schools’
institutes have enacted their own COVID-19 plans, hoping to counteract the devastating effects
of the lockdown, federal pushback, and mass closures on Confucius Institutes. While both the
future of the pandemic and CIs remain unclear, it’s difficult to asses if these online classes will
alleviate the educational and program losses.
Based on these trends, Confucius Institutes are likely to be obsolete on American
campuses in the not-too-distant future. The renaming has likely not influenced the decisions
being carried out. While the timeline is impossible to tell, strong reactions from the U.S.
government have dissuaded schools to continue partnership with the programs. By cutting
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federal funding, denouncing the institutes as espionage, and implying a new cold war with
China, American government officials have taken large steps to wipe out CIs.

U.S. Government Response
The U.S. government launched a profusion of anti-PRC policies starting in 2018,
including the infamous Department of Justice’s two-year China Initiative.60 The components
primarily sought out espionage or fraudulent activity within U.S. educational and economic
spheres; although Confucius Institutes aren’t explicity referenced, certain sections in the initiave
exist to restrict institutes like CIs. The Attorney General lists several goals for the legislation,
including to “Educate colleges and universities about potential threats to academic freedom and
open discourse from influence efforts on campus”, and more directly to “Apply the Foreign
Agents Registration Act to unregistered agents seeking to advance China’s political agenda,
bringing enforcement actions when appropriate.”61 The enactment of this initiative was one of
the first governmental moves towards ridding Confucius Institutes from college campuses.
In February of 2018 the FBI director Christopher A. Wray warned colleges that the
bureau was actively monitoring CIs for planting conspirators on campuses.62 U.S. Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo echoed the same concerns in September of 2020, hoping all Confucius
Institutes would be shut down by the end of the year. He cited the political risks associated with
Chinese-funded and operated Confucius Institutes and said that these programs recruit “spies and
collaborators” from college campuses.63 Admitting there is some resemblance to Cold War
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tensions in the 1980’s/90’s, it becomes clear that this is distinctly political criticism. Additionally
in the last year there has been a slew of U.S. government scrutiny against Confucius Institutes:
the FBI, State Department, and members of Congress have all led allegations against CIs.64 It
only follows that many public and private U.S. schools would be required to yield to the
sentiments of elite government organizations.
Representatives have continued to make public statements on the issues Confucius
Institutes pose to the U.S. government; Republican representative Christopher H. Smith has also
vocalized his opinion on the matter: Confucius Institutes “are nests of influence [and]
reconnaissance,” that monitor Chinese students and promote an idealized conception of China.65
However, Smith admits that most of CIs’ actions are benign and that there is little proof of
schools self-censoring themselves to maintain a pro-China stance. Somehow he still maintains
they are a serious threat to U.S. institutions and the government. Additionally Republican senator
Ted Cruz was quoted saying “Communist China is infiltrating American universities to meddle
with our curricula, silence criticism of their regime, and steal intellectual property including
sensitive dual-use research.”66
In an attempt to curb “academic espionage”, Cruz has introduced legislation to advance
the authority of the government in school dealings with foreign intelligence organizations. His
Stop Higher Educational Espionage and Theft Act passed in 2018 sought to target foreign
influences including China’s presence in academic aid. This also gave the federal government the
opportunity to brand an institute as a threat- which eventually led the Department of Homeland
Security to designate Confucius Institutes as a foreign mission in 2020.67 There are also several
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legislative barriers to stop the spread and longevity of the programs. For schools with a
Confucius Institute who rely on funding from the Defense Department, the McCain Act (2019)
states they could lose this federal funding unless they obtain a waiver or disband their program.68
Congress also solidified government funding restrictions with it’s 2020 Confucius Act, which
briefly stated that “An institution of higher education or other postsecondary educational
institution... shall not be eligible to receive Federal funds from the Department of Education... or
other Department of Education funds that are provided directly to students.”69 These legal
decrees present major financial obstacles for schools with Confucius Institutes, as siding with
one language/culture program is not worth jeopardizing the funding of other areas of curricula.

U.S. Academic Impact (Foreign Language Demand)
As the world becomes increasingly connected and globalized, the need for bilingual and
multilingualism has also risen. Employers and educational institutions value the human capital
that comes from foreign language proficiency: in a 2014 survey of over 2,100 U.S. employers,
93% responded that they value workers who can engage with clients from diverse
countries/cultures.70 In this same report, it was identified that 66% of individuals acknowledged
language proficiency in employee applications, and 41% gave advantages to these multilingual
contenders. The survey concluded that public sectors such as the government, information aids,
schooling, and health care actively sought out multilingual applicants. Language proficiency has
been undervalued in U.S. education, despite its obvious value in professional careers.
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U.S. Chinese language enrollment has increased in recent years, among the likes of other
growing languages such as Arabic and American Sign Language. Its overall booming growth
prior to 2013 led to an overall increase for the decade of the 2010’s.71 This information is drawn
from the Modern Language Association census data up to 2016; although the source isn’t
all-encompassing, it does give helpful references to the growth and demand of the Chinese
learning in America. The reporting shows many lucrative modern languages such as Chinese,
Arabic, Japanese, Korean, and ASL have shown increased enrollment some years while other
languages including German, Latin, and French have shown stagnant growth or decline.
Furthermore the proportion of introductory to advanced Chinese language students have shown
evolution in recent years: the ratio of advanced students continued to grow from 2009 to 2012,
perhaps showing increased interest in mastering the language or more opportunities to advance.
The 6.5% increase in graduate Chinese enrollment between 2013-2016, despite the decline at
undergraduate schools, reflects this expansion.
Beyond the high period of growth, has also been a concerning decrease in Chinese
enrollments from 2013-2016. At two and four-year undergraduate institutions introductory
students to Chinese decreased by 21.3%, while overall Chinese enrollments dropped 13.1%.72
While this might be accounted for by some of the CI closures starting in 2014, it’s essential to
note that the decline began before the widespread terminations. Between the same three years
America’s total enrollments in foreign languages dropped by 9.2%- and Chinese was able to
mitigate the decline with nearly 47% of its programs reporting stable or increased enrollments.
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With tens of thousands of students reported practicing the Chinese language, this nationwide
decline in modern languages poses a threat to the security of their studies.
The loss of many Confucius Institutes likely influenced the Chinese language enrollment
downturn. At its height there were over 500 Confucius Institutes and Classrooms active across
the U.S., buttressing hundreds of Chinese departments and supplying educational aid to
thousands of students. Currently at U.S. colleges, the number of programs has dramatically
decreased to 50. How many Chinese departments will withstand this transition is still a question
at large. It’s difficult to predict the future academic impact of these CI closures, but it is clear that
recently Chinese enrollments have been decreasing. While employers continue to value language
proficiency, the demand must be met with adequate funding and resources.

China’s Academic Soft Power in the U.S.
Confucius Institutes haved operated as a relatively successful Chinese soft power venture.
Yet if the trends continue, the onslaught of closures suggests that CIs will be eliminated in the
U.S. during the following years. While this will be an obstacle in securing favorable relations in
America, China has many other remaining prospects to help spread Chinese culture, language,
and influence. Through AP Chinese classes, CCTV, lending art to museums, and translated
Chinese novels, China still maintains soft power avenues to garner interest in its language and
culture. Although these connections to foreign countries are likely to continue, if China wants to
expand its soft power in academics it must adjust its approach.
The fundamental flaws of Confucius Institutes provide insight into the shortcomings of
China’s academic soft power. What made the institutes so undesirable was the lack of
collaboration with the partnered colleges, as well as their unwillingness to assimilate to the
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U.S.’s values of democracy and academic freedom. The CCP requires that programs abroad must
promote China’s socialism and traditional customs, which comes with many limitations. China’s
soft power ventures such as CIs will continue to fail unless changes are made to promote
discourse potentially harmful to China’s image, and engage in collaborative research and
development with the host institution.
China’s soft power is also notably shaped by its hard power behavior. The “China Threat”
and negative preconceived notions originate from its militaristic, political, and economic
wrongdoings- and influences the way benign Chinese programs are treated. This can be seen in
other avenues of academia, including the targeting of Chinese professors at prestigious research
universities. The recent arrest of Gang Chen, a professor and researcher at MIT, shines light on
this phenomenon; the China Initiative was created by the Justice Department to prosecute
Chinese scientists/researchers who were accused of sharing information with China.73 160 MIT
professors pushed back, petitioning his prosecution and arguing that all his federal grants and
academic activities were lawful. Dr. Chen’s case is no anomaly- professors from Harvard,
Temple, and Arkansas have all been charged with espionage, fraudulent funding, or aiding the
CCP. The U.S. government’s crackdown on China in academics, whether Confucius Institutes or
Chinese professors, embodies a resurgence of cold war tensions between American and China.
The CCP’s unwillingness to cooperate, lingering “China Threat”, and U.S. government
cold war tensions indicate the future of Chinese soft power in academics is relatively bleak.
Confucius Institutes serve as an example to this prediction, and I predict similar standalone
CCP-sponsored institutes would face a similar fate. Chinese AP classes, museum collections, and
media outlets will survive abroad due to their connectedness to U.S. institutions. However,
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organizations like CIs reflect what the CCP sponsors, with little to no hint at reform. Future
Chinese soft power in U.S. academics will be harder to implement, especially with the aftermath
of the failed longevity of CIs. It is expected that America will be more skeptical to work
alongside China, especially after China’s domestic wrongdoings and federal regulations
restricting Chinese intervention in U.S. education.

Conclusion
Confucius Institutes, centers for learning Chinese language and culture, have faced
extreme scrutiny in the United States. Over the last seven years over half the American institutes
have been terminated amidst an onslaught of criticism and government regulations. These
anxieties of Chinese presence in U.S. academics originated from preexisting notions such as the
“China Threat”- applying concerns of China’s politics/economics to other unrelated sectors. The
root of the China Threat, and anxieties about Confucius Institutes, have developed from years of
othering the East and non-democratic ideologies. Western nations who created this concept now
deploy this narrative against overall Chinese presence in U.S. academics.
After gauging the most pressing concerns scholars shared over Confucius Institutes, they
predominantly debated three subjects: CI censorship, program funding, and political agendas.
The censorship has been openly acknowledged by scholars, program directors, and Chinese
officials, as well as accepted by the partnered schools. It is understandable why people would
insist on academic freedom in America, but the institutes were not deceitful about this condition.
The program funding comes from the Ministry of Education, which is run by the CCP. This
heightened worries about Chinese money funneling onto U.S. college campuses- but overall is a
commonplace practice by many foreign countries. There is some skepticism if the money comes
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directly from the Ministry of Education, but there has been no evidence to prove otherwise. The
political agendas are understated and benign; Confucius Institutes are not inherently political.
The textbooks, teaching methods, and subjects have all been proven to not promote any political
sentiments. On the contrary, CIs avoid political conversations to dodge any criticism about the
CCP. While the soft power aspects of Confucius Institutes could be met with scrutiny, it is
essential to note the United States practices similar soft power ventures abroad.
Confucius Institutes have been proven to be a successful form of soft power. The
programs were able to disseminate Chinese language and culture, as well as positively impact
China’s image in CI communities. Although they failed in terms of longevity, these programs
planted a seed of interest in Chinese among these college campuses. Intellectuals have seen soft
power present in academics as a corrupting factor, arguing that it should not interfere with
studies. Others have come to see Confucius Institutes as centers of socialist brainwashing,
simultaneously writing off community actors as naive and hyper-impressionable. It’s essential to
remember these institutes are partnered with top universities, where students and staff have an
abundance of resources to formulate their own opinions. In another light, CIs can be seen as a
learning tool for students to analyze the messages from a CCP-run program. Foreign aid
presence in education is typical at U.S. colleges, so it’s interesting to contemplate why China has
been so heavily targeted.
Discussions about who should take accountability in these partnerships have
overwhelmingly been one-sided. Confucius Institutes, and furthermore the CCP, have faced the
most criticism and blame despite the collaboration of U.S. colleges. By offering the
underrepresented perspective that U.S. colleges need to take responsibility for the outrage
sparked from these partnerships, this paper recognized these schools as culpable actors. U.S.
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institutions willingly accepted funding, approved the guidelines, and openly sought Confucius
Institutes to bolster their Chinese departments. Ignoring the American self-serving aspects of this
relationship oversimplifies the issue and scapegoats China as the deceptive actor. Alternatively,
Confucius Institutes have refused to adjust as they become more scrutinized; CIs do not
collaborate with their partnered communities, and aren’t sensitive to their host country’s
concerns. By avoiding uncomfortable conversations and refusing to expand into research
projects, the programs isolate themselves and invite critique. This unbending behavior makes
Confucius Institutes much weaker and less desirable.
What the future holds for Confucius Institutes remains unclear, but the continuous trend
indicates most will be dissolved in upcoming years. There have been slight name modifications,
but no real structural changes have been established. With the onslaught of U.S. government
funding restrictions to schools with CIs, these policies aim to make Chinese presence in
academia obsolete. The academic impact of these closures may be substantial; modern languages
are underfunded and undervalued at many U.S. colleges, so the loss of CI funding could
negatively impact many Chinese programs. Chinese has been proven to be a professionally
desirable skill, and helps launch students into international careers. Further reductions in Chinese
enrollment could result in a lack of American talent in Chinese-speaking relevant industries.
China’s soft power also faces a threat from the wipeout of the CIs. Confucius Institutes have
been a relatively successful soft power program, as China has had difficulty influencing foreign
academia. Confucius Institutes may eventually meet an unfortunate end, but they successfully
managed to endorse Chinese language and culture in the foreign consciousness.
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